



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
Design of Assistance 
Programs to Address 
Real Income Volatility 
 
 



















Chapter 8 (pp. 217-258) in: 
Volatility and Food Assistance in the United States 
Dean Jolliffe, James P. Ziliak, eds. 




Copyright ©2008. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
217
8
Design of Assistance Programs to 







Université du Québec à Montréal
Over the past two decades, changes in income volatility and its 
sources have received increasing attention (Blundell, Pistaferri, and 
Preston 2004; Gottschalk and Moffi t 1994; Haider 2001). Increases in 
income volatility raise issues of public concern. What impact will great-
er volatility have on household consumption and welfare? More specifi -
cally, how does a change in volatility affect recipients of government as-
sistance? Obviously the answer will depend in part on the source of the 
volatility. It could be due to exogenous shocks or household decisions. 
Furthermore, the design of assistance programs will help determine 
the impact of income volatility on assistance recipients. This raises the 
question of how assistance programs should be designed when potential 
recipients face income instability? Determining the principles involved 
in designing assistance programs for low-income persons when their 
income and needs are volatile is the focus of this chapter.1 
Many of the issues that arise in designing assistance programs when 
income is stable also apply when it is volatile. Welfare and social insur-
ance programs are typically targeted on the basis of some measures of 
need, such as income, assets, employment, and family circumstances. 
Standard approaches to program design stress both the normative is-
sues involved in defi ning need and eligibility and the administrative is-
sues involved in implementing the eligibility criteria and delivering and 
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distributing cash or goods. Implementation must deal with asymmetric 
information problems, which preclude program administrators from 
achieving perfect targeting. This leads to both Type I and Type II errors, 
resulting in (for Type I) less than full coverage of the target population 
and (for Type II) leakage of funds from the program. Undercoverage 
may also occur because eligible persons are ill-informed about their 
entitlements or because of the stigmatization associated with receiv-
ing welfare. Information problems include hidden actions that make it 
diffi cult to screen out ineligible persons. Households may change their 
behavior to become eligible or may fail to take actions that are required 
for eligibility, such as engaging in a job search or reapplying for ben-
efi ts. Moreover, informational asymmetries enjoyed by administrators 
may lead to agency problems and consequently imperfect targeting of 
assistance. For example, only administrators may be able to observe the 
characteristics of welfare applicants, and if they have different prefer-
ences than the government regarding which individuals should receive 
assistance then there could be undercoverage of the target population. 
Agency problems may also arise if the effort to classify welfare appli-
cants is costly for administrators and unobservable by the government. 
Again in this case, administrators may incorrectly (from the point of 
view of the government) classify welfare applicants. 
These standard problems of welfare program design are exacer-
bated when the need for assistance is volatile and low-income house-
holds are unable to insure fully against the volatility. The possibility 
of unexpected changes in circumstances makes the eligibility require-
ments for assistance—including the targeting of benefi ts, the frequency 
of certifi cation, the reporting mechanisms, and the timeliness of sup-
port—very important. An ideal program would react quickly and accu-
rately to persons unexpectedly moving from noneligibility to eligibility, 
while avoiding adverse incentive effects. It would also respond quickly 
to those whose circumstances change in the opposite direction, though 
presumably with less urgency.
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SOURCES OF REAL INCOME VOLATILITY
Complexity in designing low-income support programs to address 
volatility arises mainly because volatility comes from a variety of 
sources. Some of these will be exogenous and beyond individual con-
trol. Others will be in part a consequence of individual actions. 
Exogenous Sources of Volatility
The most obvious exogenous shock that employable low-income 
persons might face is a change in employment income. For example, 
an individual might be laid off or incur a workplace injury. Real in-
come shocks can also occur from changes in the various prices facing 
low-income households. They might also be the result of a partially 
or completely uninsured adverse event. An individual may suffer from 
a change in health status, either temporary or permanent, that entails 
sudden medical expenses and often a loss of employment income. A 
supporting person may suffer a similar fate, which also may affect the 
individual. The individual may also face a loss of community support 
because of a shock to the local community, such as the closure of an 
industry or a natural disaster. Some of these shocks can be either an-
ticipated or observed. For others, detecting the changed circumstances 
of affected persons may take time, and even then may be subject to 
some errors in observation. That constitutes a signifi cant problem for 
program design.
Volatility Resulting from Individual Choice
Changes in real income might be the result of personal decisions 
affecting the low-income individual’s employment status, living cir-
cumstances, consumption, or social capital. Changes in employment 
income might be in part a result of individual behavior. Workers might 
lose their jobs for cause, or they might voluntarily quit or reduce their 
hours of work. Their income can also change if they engage in nonmar-
ket or underground activities, either to supplement or to substitute for 
formal work. 
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Real income changes can also occur if low-income individuals 
change their living circumstances. They may decide to cohabitate or to 
terminate cohabitation, or to change the size of their family. Their eco-
nomic well-being can also change because of consumption choices. If 
they overspend by borrowing, the subsequent fi nancing of the debt may 
leave insuffi cient resources for other needs and may even force them 
into personal bankruptcy. Similarly, they may commit themselves to 
housing costs that exceed their means and that are hard to escape in the 
short run because of contractual obligations. Their personal behavior 
may even result in eviction from existing housing.
Finally, they may suffer a loss in social capital because of personal 
decisions. If they choose to move to a different city or neighborhood, 
they lose their network of friends and other social support mechanisms, 
at least temporarily. There is also the loss of social capital for those who 
have been incarcerated after being convicted of committing a crime. 
The government may prefer to address the consequences of adver-
sity arising from voluntary choices differently from those arising exog-
enously. However, distinguishing the two may be diffi cult.
Labor Market Rigidities as a Source of Uncertainty
If low-income individuals could immediately fi nd suitable work af-
ter either a voluntary or an involuntary leave from employment, then 
changes in employment income as a source of income volatility would 
greatly be reduced. Rigidities in the labor market, however, generally 
prevent this from happening, so even those looking for work may re-
main unemployed for an uncertain length of time. 
Involuntary unemployment can arise from various sources. Firms 
may fi nd it in their interest to offer an effi ciency wage, which will gen-
erally be larger than the market-clearing wage. Structural unemploy-
ment can also arise when a portion of the labor market is unionized 
or when there is economic restructuring or outsourcing. Labor market 
rigidities induced by the government (such as a binding minimum wage 
and unemployment insurance) may also be a source of involuntary un-
employment. There will also generally be some frictional unemploy-
ment because of business cycles and job searches. 
The labor market may also entail indivisibilities that make it more 
diffi cult for some individuals to enter or remain attached to it. For 
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various technological and coordination reasons, many jobs require a 
minimum number of work hours, and this may not suit low-income 
individuals with other demands on their time (Saez 2002). Low hourly 
wage jobs may not be attractive because they do not offer long enough 
hours to be worth taking. Time spent on household production may be 
more valuable than earning a low wage in the market. Indivisibilities as 
a source of unemployment may be viewed as involuntary or voluntary 
depending on the circumstances. 
RESPONSES TO REAL INCOME VOLATILITY
Individual responses to volatility depend upon both market options 
and support programs available from government and nongovernment 
sources. 
Individual Responses to Volatility
Suppose that low-income individuals are subject to an unexpected 
negative shock to their real income. Some of this may be offset by pre-
viously acquired market insurance or by government support programs. 
It is likely, though, that some residual consequences will remain. Thus, 
unemployment insurance does not fully replace lost income: individu-
als cannot insure against shocks in their cost of living, insurance against 
many forms of accident are available only with a deductible or coinsur-
ance, and so on. Government support programs will also leave individ-
uals to bear part of the shock. Because the government cannot perfectly 
observe either the actions of affected individuals or the source of the 
shock, it will not offer full insurance. By the same token, government 
support programs will not respond instantaneously. It will take time for 
the changed circumstances of potential recipients to be registered and 
verifi ed. At the very least, individuals will need to respond temporarily 
to real income shocks. The following list summarizes six ways in which 
low-income persons might respond to such shocks.
 1. They might deplete their assets—including fi nancial assets, 
housing and other consumer durables, and valuable objects. If 
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in debt, they may not be able to make interest payments and 
may even declare personal bankruptcy.
 2. The composition of consumption expenditures might change. 
They may spend a higher proportion of their incomes on basic 
necessities, such as food and shelter, while forgoing less nec-
essary items, such as new clothing and entertainment. 
 3. To obtain cash quickly, they might resort to high-cost sources 
of borrowing, such as credit cards, cash marts, loan sharks, 
pawn shops, and personal acquaintances.
 4. They may change the number of hours worked, seeking part-
time work or changing jobs. Other family members, including 
children, might enter the workforce. They may obtain some 
earnings through self-employment or odd jobs. In extreme 
cases, they may participate in the underground economy or en-
gage in illegal activities. 
 5. They may take advantage of sources of outside support (non-
governmental). This can include members of their extended 
family or charities (food banks, secondhand clothing shops, 
public shelters, etc.). 
 6. Finally, they may be forced to move from their neighborhood 
or city and reestablish themselves elsewhere, losing social net-
works that they have built up. 
These actions obviously have potentially serious consequences, but 
some caveats should be mentioned. First, some low-income persons 
facing income shocks will have taken precautionary measures, espe-
cially if their circumstances were uncertain ex ante. Others will have 
social support networks to help them through. 
Second, these individuals may be responsible to varying degrees for 
their plight. The temporary shocks they face may be a consequence of 
their own actions. They may have overextended themselves fi nancially 
or undersaved, committed themselves to expensive housing, or taken 
actions that brought about their own loss of income. 
Third, the consequences of adverse income shocks may depend 
upon the preferences and circumstances of households. Persons who 
are more risk-averse or living close to subsistence levels will feel more 
urgently the need to compensate for the effect the shock has had on 
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their consumption. They will try to smooth their consumption, despite 
the costs. The consequence, as Chetty and Looney (2006) have pointed 
out, is that observations of relatively smooth consumption streams do 
not necessarily indicate that social insurance programs are of no value. 
On the contrary, if persons are highly risk-averse, social insurance will 
be valuable to them even if their consumption streams are relatively 
smooth in its absence. With social insurance, they will no longer have to 
rely on costly and ineffi cient mechanisms to insure themselves against 
income shocks. These caveats make the problem of government policy 
more complicated, both from the point of view of being able to obtain 
the relevant information on individuals and from the point of view of 
deciding on who deserves support. 
Market and Policy Failures May Preclude Full Self-Protection
Informational problems affecting insurance markets make it diffi -
cult for the market to properly assist households in protecting them-
selves against income uncertainty. First, moral hazard—the diffi culty 
of observing the actions of insurees—implies that competitive insurers 
would not break even if they offered actuarially fair insurance contracts. 
For that reason, insurers will require coinsurance from buyers who, by 
defi nition, will be left with incomplete insurance. Second, adverse se-
lection—the diffi culty of observing the risk characteristics of the insu-
rees—will give an incentive to insurers to screen insurees by offering 
them a menu of contracts. In one standard case, insurees who are a good 
risk will be offered less than full insurance to prevent bad risks from 
purchasing the contract destined for those insurees that represent a good 
risk. In the most severe case of adverse selection, insurance contracts 
will simply not be offered (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). 
Informational problems also affect credit markets. Because of mor-
al hazard, lenders may be reluctant to fi nance some projects and may 
require cofi nancing from the borrowers. Obviously, for households who 
need to borrow quickly because of an adverse income shock, and who 
can only offer, as a guarantee of repayment, that they will, say, fi nd a 
new job, this may mean that they will simply be unable to borrow. As 
for adverse selection, creditors may be unable to distinguish loans by 
the quality of borrowers and the chances that the loan will be repaid. 
This can cause higher interest rates for all individuals who want to bor-
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row (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). It may also imply that individuals with 
some characteristics will simply be unable to borrow because they are 
deemed to be too risky on average (Mankiw 1986). For these reasons, 
some individuals will be shut out of the credit markets. Usually the 
most vulnerable are those most likely to be shut out.2
The design of low-income support programs can also inadvertently 
preclude self-insurance. Often a condition for qualifying for support 
programs is that an individual cannot own more than a given amount 
of assets (Currie 2006). Such a restriction is equivalent to forbidding 
precautionary savings above some level, and it obliges recipients to fi nd 
more costly ways to respond to risk.3 Stores in poor neighborhoods may 
exploit the timing of support payments by increasing prices to extract 
as much surplus as possible from welfare recipients (Tanguay, Hunt, 
and Marceau 2005). Welfare recipients may circumvent that by stor-
ing some items, but for perishable products that is infeasible. Finally, 
the possibility of government support may induce risky behavior in in-
stances where the government cannot commit to not helping out those 
in need; thus the government faces the Samaritan’s dilemma (Bruce 
and Waldman 1991). If individuals understand that governments cannot 
resist providing help to those in need, some might reason that there is no 
need to save since they will nevertheless be offered welfare assistance 
(Ziliak 2003).
Limited Ability to Self-Insure
Even when risks can be insured, low-income households may not 
have the fi nancial resources to purchase insurance. The more compre-
hensive an insurance contract is, the more costly it should be to pur-
chase. The relative demand for insurance is likely to be greater for low-
income than for high-income persons. Ihori and McGuire (2006) show 
that if preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, which is 
the usual assumption, insurance will be an inferior good. Low-income 
households will therefore be especially affected by the costliness of in-
surance. For some types of insurable events, such as theft, low-income 
persons may face higher premiums because of living in riskier areas, or 
they may not own enough valuables to make the purchase of insurance 
worthwhile. The form of available insurance contracts may also pre-
clude its purchase by low-income individuals. For example, individuals 
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without access to the formal credit market will only have cash to pay for 
insurance, a payment option that might not be acceptable. 
Low-income individuals are also less likely to be covered by em-
ployer-sponsored insurance. This may be because they choose not to par-
ticipate in an employer-sponsored insurance system, possibly because 
of cost or because their employer does not offer it. If skilled workers are 
relatively scarce in the market and workers value insurance, then fi rms 
may offer them relatively more attractive compensation packages than 
those offered to unskilled workers. By offering group insurance, em-
ployers can pool the risk of all of their workers and thereby face lower 
insurance cost per insured person than what the individual would pay 
on his or her own. Employer-sponsored insurance contracts may also 
be longer-term than those offered to individuals. Indeed, the short-term 
nature of individual health insurance contracts is often cited as a ma-
jor source of market failure in health insurance (Cutler 2002). In addi-
tion, employer payments for health insurance often receive preferential 
tax treatment. Finally, such in-kind compensation could also help bind 
workers to fi rms. The potential profi tability of offering in-kind com-
pensation in lieu of wages is more likely to occur at fi rms employing 
high-wage workers, since fi rms employing minimum-wage workers are 
restricted from reducing wages. The end result is that skilled (high-in-
come) workers may be better protected against adverse events. 
Even if low-income persons have equal access to self-insurance, it 
might be more costly for low-income persons to self-insure than high-
income ones. First, if the marginal utility of income is decreasing, then 
to set a given fraction of one’s income aside for the eventuality of bad 
luck is more costly for low-income than for high-income individuals. 
Second, there are transaction costs in fi nancial markets, a portion of 
which are fi xed costs, so transacting is relatively more expensive for 
those who own fewer assets. Diversifying risk using fi nancial markets 
is more costly for low-income individuals because they tend to own 
fewer assets. Third, and related to the above discussion, it may be that 
risk aversion is decreasing in income. Finally, assuming an individu-
al’s network is made up of similar individuals, low-income individuals 
will have more diffi culty borrowing from family and friends than high-
income ones, because the former have less discretionary income, and 
therefore savings, available to lend to others. 
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Supply-Side Responses to Circumvent Market Failures
Because low-income individuals tend to be less educated, and be-
cause of the complexity of some government insurance and assistance 
programs, some private companies provide services to help potentially 
eligible individuals access government programs. Generally these pri-
vate companies will charge the individuals for their services and there-
by reduce the net assistance received by those using them.
Many alternative sources of credit for low-income persons outside 
of the formal credit market have also developed. Some of these are 
legal, such as pawn shops or cash-in-advance stores, while others are il-
legal. At pawn shops, individuals may leave some collateral good at the 
store in exchange for credit. If the loan is repaid within a certain period, 
the individual regains possession of the collateral good. Otherwise, the 
collateral good remains the possession of the store, which may sell it to 
other customers. Cash-in-advance stores or cash marts offer individuals 
advances on their pay at some fi xed cost or may cash checks immedi-
ately at a fee. Pawn shops and cash-in-advance stores constitute a costly 
source of fi nance for low-income persons because of the high default 
rates and the associated loss of collateral goods or high service fees. In 
some cases, innovative institutional mechanisms have evolved to help 
address the failure of standard credit markets. For example, cooperative 
savings arrangements that provide microcredit to participants might al-
leviate some of the liquidity constraints faced by low-income house-
holds. Illegal credit obtained from loan sharks, gambling schemes, and 
the fencing of stolen goods constitutes another costly source of credit 
for low-income individuals. But because these are often the sole sources 
of fi nance available for such persons, they continue to exist. In addition 
to being costly, they can put users at personal risk of going to jail or 
suffering bodily harm.
Low-income households facing an adverse income shock may not 
be able to afford products in the formal or regulated sector and may turn 
to the informal sector. They might live in dwellings not up to building 
codes, use unlicensed repair persons, or leave their children in unli-
censed home day-cares. Consumption of these unregulated services may 
put the individuals and their families at risk for injury or other health 
problems. These households may also be tempted to work in the black 
market. This is risky since they might be detected by the authorities, 
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resulting not only in termination of the employment relationship but 
also in the possibility of criminal punishment. Furthermore, employees 
in the black market have no insurance coverage, be it public or private, 
and no recourse against their employer in the event of a confl ict.
Finally, private charities have developed to assist those in need who 
have no insurance or access to credit, and for whom government help is 
insuffi cient. Then there are some individuals who simply refuse govern-
ment assistance. For all of these cases, charities offer a wide range of 
programs and services. Some, such as food banks, shelters, and com-
munity outreach programs, provide services specifi cally for individu-
als with immediate needs. Charities might also offer services to help 
individuals gain access to government resources as well as help provide 
medical services to uninsured individuals and legal services for low-
income persons. While these charities provide useful assistance, those 
who use them have no guarantee they will obtain help in the future. 
Because of the discretion of private charities in the way they distribute 
aid and uncertainty about their ongoing budgets, low-income individu-
als using them face the risk of eventually being without help (Allard, 
forthcoming). This is a signifi cant risk and may explain why public as-
sistance is far more developed than private charities. 
GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES
The design of support programs depends on the government’s ob-
jectives. From a normative perspective, there are many possible objec-
tives for low-income support programs. Policy intervention could be 
motivated by equity, social insurance, equality of opportunity, or pater-
nalism. Each of these might prescribe a different type of program. 
Welfaristic Objectives
The standard analysis of redistribution supposes that governments 
judge policy outcomes according to how they affect the welfare of in-
dividuals in the economy. A major issue, then, is how to aggregate indi-
vidual welfare levels into a social ordering. Conceptually, there are two 
approaches to addressing this issue. One is to suppose that redistribution 
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to the poor is motivated by the altruism of the nonpoor (Hochman and 
Rodgers 1969). According to this view, redistribution can be effi ciency-
enhancing, but because of a free-riding problem associated with altru-
istic transfers to the poor, the government must step in on behalf of the 
nonpoor. This altruism approach essentially sidesteps normative issues 
of equity by putting all the weight on the preferences of the nonpoor. 
An alternative approach is to suppose that there is a social welfare 
function that aggregates the utilities of all persons in the economy based 
on some ethical precepts. The problem is that it is not clear how such a 
social welfare function is agreed upon. A common approach is to sup-
pose that persons will have social preferences that are distinct from 
their individual preferences based on self-interest (Arrow 1951). They 
might, for example, imagine themselves before they learn the charac-
teristics that they will be endowed with—that is, behind the “veil of 
ignorance” (Rawls 1971). Even here, there is unlikely to be full agree-
ment on the social welfare function, given that it embodies important 
value judgments about the measurement and aggregation of individual 
utilities. Nonetheless, the social welfare function approach is useful as a 
methodological device since it allows one to consider the consequences 
of various initial value judgments. 
A useful way to proceed is to consider a social welfare function 
exhibiting constant aversion to inequality in individual real incomes. 
Formally, it may be written as
 
    ,
where yi is the real income of household i with i = 1, . . . , n. The advan-
tage of using this function is that it captures the weight put on equity 
in the economy in a single parameter, ρ.4 Assuming that the aversion to 
inequality is nonnegative, ρ can take values between zero (the utilitar-
ian case) and infi nity (the maximin or Rawlsian case). The greater the 
aversion to inequality, the more redistribution will be called for in the 
sense that the more equal will be the fi nal outcomes. 
The single-parameter social welfare function approach seems rea-
sonable when households vary according to only one characteristic, 
but diffi cult issues arise in more general settings. If households have 
different preferences, comparing welfare across households becomes 
conceptually problematic. There is no well-defi ned comparable mea-
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sure of real income across households when individual preference or-
derings are heterogeneous. How then should welfare comparisons be 
made among persons with different preferences? One approach, fol-
lowing Roemer (1998) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (forthcoming), is 
to argue that circumstances that are the consequence of personal choice 
should not affect redistribution; only differences in well-being that re-
sult from exogenous characteristics over which households have no in-
fl uence should. Thus, if preferences are regarded as a matter of personal 
choice—and that is not entirely obvious—they are the responsibility of 
individuals and should not affect redistribution. Redistribution should 
only compensate persons for things over which they have no control, 
such as their innate ability. Applying these principles of compensation 
and responsibility in practice is not easy, although some attempts have 
been made (Roemer 1998). In a world with full information and lump-
sum taxes, it is impossible to satisfy both principles simultaneously. 
Without full information, matters are even more problematic because it 
is diffi cult to tell whether low income is due to a preference for leisure 
or to low innate ability. This will be important for low-income support 
programs since there are many dimensions along which both prefer-
ences and characteristics may differ.
Diffi culties also arise when persons have more than one character-
istic. For one thing, multidimensional screening problems can occur 
if households differ by two or more characteristics, such as produc-
tivity and riskiness, and this makes program design diffi cult (Besley 
and Coate 1995). For another, policy prescriptions can become unclear 
when persons differ in ways other than productivity.5 
Nonwelfaristic Objectives
The social welfare function approach ranks social outcomes solely 
according to how they affect individual utilities. Policymakers may also 
attach weight to objectives that do not refl ect individual preferences 
(Sen 1970). Indeed, altruistic approaches may also take account of non-
welfare consequences of policies. There are several examples of this 
that are relevant for considering low-income support programs. One 
widespread objective is equality of opportunity. Equality of opportu-
nity can be taken to mean many things, but broadly it refers to the idea 
of persons being put on an equal footing with respect to their options 
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to participate in society. Thus, equality of opportunity can include re-
sources devoted to improving the skills of low-income persons, or more 
generally the assets they require to prosper in the market (Sen 1999). It 
can also involve improving their physical or mental fi tness. Equality of 
opportunity can be seen as a form of ex ante redistribution as opposed 
to equalizing ex post market outcomes through the tax transfer system. 
Another nonwelfaristic objective is poverty alleviation, where 
the objective may be to remove as many people as possible from be-
low some poverty line in consumption or income (Kanbur, Keen, and 
Tuomala 1995). Since poverty alleviation typically ignores the value of 
leisure to those in poverty, it is nonwelfaristic.
There may be other nonwelfaristic objectives taken into account by 
policymakers, such as social cohesion, crime reduction, various free-
doms, nondiscrimination, the fostering of family and social values, and 
so on. In the literature on redistribution, fairness or absence of envy has 
been investigated as a property of redistribution programs (Nishimura 
2003). As well, the sanctity of property rights has been emphasized by 
some, either as an objective or as a constraint on redistribution (Nozick 
1974).
The government might also be concerned with the cost of a given 
assistance program, program take-up, the social stigma associated with 
the program, and how the program will affect the assistance that re-
cipients receive from private sources. It may put more weight on Type 
I errors (incomplete coverage of the target population) than on Type 
II errors (leakages to the nondeserving). Targeting programs to a sub-
set of the population may be less costly since assistance is only given 
to a group of individuals. On the other hand, obtaining the informa-
tion needed to identify the target group might make the program more 
costly. Targeted programs might also generate greater stigma since only 
some individuals are receiving assistance (Atkinson 1995). Such design 
issues are discussed further below.
Paternalistic Objectives
Finally, governments may take a quasiwelfaristic approach in the 
sense of giving weight to the well-being of persons yet evaluating that 
well-being not according to the preferences revealed by individuals 
themselves but according to preferences chosen by the government. 
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These paternalistic preferences may be justifi ed from an altruistic per-
spective as refl ecting the weights that the nonpoor put on the consump-
tion patterns of the poor. Thus, nonpoor taxpayers may put relatively 
high weight on the consumption of some products, such as food, shel-
ter, and clothing, and relatively low weight on others, such as alcohol, 
cigarettes, and even leisure. While this paternalistic approach to redis-
tribution may offend those who adopt a normative perspective, it is a 
consequence of the altruistic view of redistribution.
Paternalism may also emerge in an otherwise welfaristic framework 
if one adopts recent fi ndings from the behavioral economics literature. 
That literature has stressed various ways in which individual behavior 
does not conform to the rational, well-informed, farsighted, self-inter-
ested view of standard economic theory (Bernheim and Rangel 2007; 
Rabin 1998). Of particular relevance for redistribution is the suggestion 
that persons may sometimes take decisions that are not in their own 
self-interest. This may refl ect bounded rationality, whereby they do 
not understand fully the options available to them. For example, many 
people do not understand the various types of fi nancial instruments or 
the risks associated with the choices they have to make. Some govern-
ment policies seem to be infl uenced by these shortcomings in consumer 
knowledge and perceptions, such as rules governing the disclosure of 
product information, regulations on interest rates that can be charged on 
credit card debt, safety regulations, seat belt rules, and even mandatory 
savings in managed fi nancial accounts. 
As well, households may exhibit shortsightedness and impatience 
in various contexts. This has been modeled using the concept of time-
inconsistent intertemporal preferences (Laibson 1997; Strotz 1956). 
The idea, based on experimental research, is that persons systematically 
discount the next period’s consumption relative to consumption today 
at a higher rate than consumption between two periods in the future. As 
time goes on, this bias in favor of today’s consumption persists so that, 
effectively, preferences change over time. This leads to a tendency to 
overconsume (undersave) in the sense that if households could choose 
at some time before t their consumption stream for periods t onwards, 
they would consume less at time t and more later on. This kind of impa-
tience can have other consequences than simply undersaving. It might 
cause persons to discount future adverse consequences of current be-
havior, leading to problems of addiction, risky behavior, procrastina-
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tion, obesity, lack of exercise, underexertion in education, and perhaps 
even criminal behavior. Given that people typically come to regret the 
shortsighted decisions that they have taken, there may be grounds for 
government policies to offset these tendencies by regulation, in-kind 
transfers, or taxation and subsidization. One might expect the incidence 
of impatience to be higher among low-income persons, if only because 
the actions themselves tend to reduce income-generating activities. 
The argument for government intervention in the face of impatience 
in individual behavior is controversial. Some might object to govern-
ment paternalism on principle and argue that people ought to bear the 
consequences of their own actions. Others might argue that the fi ndings 
of behavioral economics have yet to be established with suffi cient cer-
tainty. A further line of argument is that people should be able to rec-
ognize that their preferences lead to time-inconsistent behavior. These 
relatively more sophisticated persons should be able to take actions that 
precommit themselves to avoiding the full consequences that happen to 
those who are simply myopic. However, even these farsighted persons 
are not likely to overcome the problem completely.
GOVERNMENT CONSTRAINTS
One source of complexity in designing support programs to address 
real income volatility of low-income households is the enormous het-
erogeneity of potential recipients. In a fi rst-best world (i.e., one in which 
the government has full information and access to any policy instru-
ment), the government could perfectly insure low-income individuals 
against real income volatility. This fi rst-best outcome is not attainable 
when individual characteristics and circumstances are not perfectly ob-
servable by the government.
Characteristics of Potential Recipients
We begin with a consideration of three key classes of characteris-
tics that can vary widely among persons, can contribute to low-income 
status, and can involve private information: individual preferences, en-
dowed personal characteristics, and attachment to the labor market. 
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Individual preferences
Dealing with differences in preferences poses challenging policy 
problems that only recently have come to the fore in the public econom-
ics literature, as discussed above. The following are some important 
sources of preference heterogeneity. 
Preferences for leisure. Individuals may differ in their preferences 
for leisure or, more generally, in their willingness to provide work ef-
fort that will affect their real incomes. Apart from the diffi culties that 
differences in preferences for leisure pose for welfare comparisons, the 
government will have diffi culty in distinguishing recipients on the basis 
of their preferences for leisure. The consequence of such differences 
will be observationally equivalent to differences in the ability to earn 
income if the government cannot observe ability either (Cuff 2000; 
Boadway et al. 2002).
Preferences for goods. Individuals may also differ in their prefer-
ences for various goods. They may devote differing proportions of their 
income to cigarettes, alcohol, and gambling, as well as to expensive 
cars, large houses and other consumer durables. This will have con-
sequences for the design of support programs to the extent that they 
involve in-kind transfers. It can also affect cash transfer programs—for 
example, if there are limits to asset ownership in the welfare system. 
And, it may also have implications for dealing with real income volatil-
ity, such as would be the case if some persons have incurred contractual 
obligations for consumer durable purchases. Another important issue 
is the preference for immediate over future consumption. Those who 
want to consume heavily when young, when their wages are low, tend 
to have low income in the future because they are less willing to forgo 
income in order to invest in schooling. On the contrary, those who are 
willing to accept a low consumption level when young—or who are 
simply more patient—will invest in schooling and earn a higher income 
when old. These choices affect both the number of income support re-
cipients and the way that support should be fi nanced.
Risk aversion. The extent to which a person has risk aversion is 
particularly important in an environment of real income volatility. It 
affects both the costs of risk associated with volatility as well as the 
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incentives to take measures to deal with it (Chetty and Looney 2006). 
Moreover, differences in degrees of risk aversion will affect the extent 
to which an individual is willing to engage in risky activities and thus 
be exposed to real income volatility.
Propensity to commit crime. Criminal behavior can be both a 
source and a consequence of adverse personal outcomes, and persons 
might be tempted into criminal behavior with varying propensities, an 
assumption often found in the literature on law and economics (Becker 
1968). While there are no doubt various underlying causes for persons 
to have different propensities to engage in criminal behavior, for our 
purposes we can take these propensities as exogenous and imperfectly 
observable to the government. Criminal behavior itself can take a wide 
number of forms, including tax evasion, working in the underground 
economy, fraud with respect to support programs, dealing in illegal sub-
stances, property crime, and crime against persons. The potential inter-
dependence of criminal behavior and income volatility is an important 
consideration in designing support programs. 
Propensity to exploit support programs. Persons might also differ 
in their willingness to change their behavior simply to take advantage 
of government support programs, even if such behavior is not, strictly 
speaking, illegal. The analogue would be with tax avoidance as a way 
of reducing one’s tax burden or reducing work effort to qualify for 
training programs (Ashenfelter 1978). The design of most government 
programs relies to a degree on the willingness of persons to comply vol-
untarily with the programs’ purposes and requirements. The possibility 
that households will exploit programs by not acting in good faith af-
fects both the generosity of programs and the need to build in detection 
and enforcement mechanisms to preclude access by those for whom the 
programs are not intended. 
 Problems of self-control. As mentioned, recent work in behavioral 
economics has stressed that persons may systematically overdiscount 
future outcomes and behave in a myopic way, and that they subsequent-
ly may regret their choices (Bernheim and Rangel 2007; Rabin 1998). 
They may overspend in the aggregate and on particular goods, adopt an 
unhealthy lifestyle, and make choices that can lead to future addictions 
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(e.g., to nicotine, alcohol, gambling, or drugs). The intensity of this type 
of self-control problem can vary across persons and will not be observ-
able to the government, although some of the consequences will be.
Stigmatization. Support programs may depend on voluntary take-
up by targeted recipients. To the extent that targeting engenders a feel-
ing of stigma by recipients or causes other members of the population 
to stigmatize program recipients, the effectiveness of the program in 
reaching the target population may be limited (Atkinson 1995; Jacquet 
and Van der Linden 2006). Feelings of stigmatization likely vary in 
intensity among different persons.
Beliefs in the source of success. Finally, some recent literature 
theorizing about the source of differences in the generosity of social 
protection among countries, and especially between the United States 
and other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), has suggested that persons may hold differing 
beliefs about the relative importance of hard work versus luck in gener-
ating personal success (Bénabou and Tirole 2006). Those who believe 
luck is more important than effort may put in less effort and the conse-
quences will be self-enforcing. It is diffi cult to know the extent to which 
such beliefs are motivating factors. If policymakers themselves believe 
that effort is a more important determinant of success, they may offer 
less generous redistribution programs.
Personal characteristics
The standard literature on redistribution has long emphasized en-
dowed characteristics as the main determinants of differences in well-
being. It has focused especially on those characteristics that were cor-
related with earning power (Mirrlees 1971). However, the scope of 
relevant characteristics can be broader than that, especially for lower-
income persons. The following summarizes some of the more important 
exogenous characteristics affecting individual welfare. 
Skills. Household skills may be innate, as in the traditional approach, 
or may be acquired through experience, training, or human capital in-
vestment. Skill differences may result in different wage rates, but they 
may also refl ect differences in employability (Parsons 1996). Skills can 
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be very different in type. They can be general or specifi c skills. They can 
include communication skills, multitasking skills, intellectual skills, or 
physical skills. In the extreme, persons may be unemployable because 
of very low skills or because of a disability. Moreover, households may 
have acquired skills that are obsolete or inappropriate for the jobs that 
are available. These variations in personal skills have implications for 
the types of policy instruments used in support programs.
Needs. Individuals may differ in their ability to obtain utility from 
income and therefore will have different income needs to obtain the 
same level of well-being (Boadway and Pestieau 2006; Rowe and 
Woolley 1999). These differences can refl ect their permanent physical 
condition or their current health status, leading to disability expenses on 
the one hand and medical expenses on the other. Differences in the need 
for income can also refl ect their living circumstances, such as whether 
they live alone or cohabitate, or whether they have dependents to sup-
port. Some of these personal characteristics will be exogenous; others 
are a matter of choice. Many of them will be observable to the govern-
ment, as will changes in them. Support programs will generally try to 
address the volatility in such needs. Of course, in some cases, the gov-
ernment may not be able to fully compensate individuals for whatever 
their expenditure needs are, even if the needs could be observed. 
Risk of illness. Individuals may differ systematically in their risk of 
becoming ill. Not only will high-risk persons face a greater chance of 
suffering an adverse shock to their well-being, but they may fi nd it more 
diffi cult to get insured, depending on whether insurance companies can 
observe their risk class (Boadway et al. 2006). Illness is one source of 
volatility in real incomes, and government intervention may involve 
either cash support or the provision of health care. 
Assets. At any given time, households may vary in the assets that 
they acquired in the past or inherited, including fi nancial assets, real 
property, and Social Security wealth. They may even be in a negative 
asset position, having acquired debt that has not been repaid. Moreover, 
their credit rating may have been adversely affected by past fi nancial 
problems. The ownership of assets, including durable goods such as 
automobiles, typically plays a role in eligibility for income support pro-
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grams. For example, to qualify for assistance under TANF the value of a 
household’s countable assets, including savings and possibly some por-
tion of the value of its automobile, must fall below a certain level. Such 
asset limits clearly restrict the asset holdings of recipient households 
and prevent them from saving. Along with these traditional forms of 
asset wealth, individuals may have access to varying degrees of social 
capital, including extended families or support networks of different 
sizes that may be drawn on in times of need (Putnam 2000).6 Such so-
cial capital could also infl uence individuals’ decisions about education, 
occupation, and other long-term decisions affecting their earning ability 
and ultimately their potential need for support programs. For example, 
a person is more likely to be on welfare if his or her parents were on 
welfare, thus creating a dependency cycle. Or, that person may drop out 
of school because that is what friends or role models are doing (Akerlof 
1997). 
Labor market attachment
Labor income is an important source of volatility for some low-in-
come persons. Its relevance depends on the extent to which individuals 
are attached to the labor market, and that can vary from person to per-
son in a number of dimensions.
Employables with some labor market attachment. Persons who 
are potentially employable—that is, who have some capability of work-
ing productively—can be in a variety of states of employment. Some 
may be employed full time, albeit in jobs with varying degrees of earn-
ings and security. Others might be in part-time jobs, either by choice or 
by necessity. These jobs may also be more or less secure. Even these 
employed persons might be potential candidates for income support, 
depending on their personal circumstances. Some of them may not be 
working in the short term because of illness, injury, or family respon-
sibilities such as parental leave or caring for an ill dependent. Employ-
able persons might also be temporarily unemployed, having been laid 
off or being in the process of changing jobs. Their status may refl ect the 
riskiness or seasonal nature of their jobs, or it may refl ect an economy-
wide shock. Other, less fortunate persons may be employable in prin-
ciple, but nonetheless they are in long-term unemployment. Their skills 
may be too low for potential employers, given their location or the ex-
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istence of rigidities like minimum wages. Or, they may be involuntarily 
unemployed because of effi ciency wages or search ineffi ciencies. These 
are persons who are able to work but either cannot fi nd jobs or are not 
actively seeking them because of discouragement or preference. Re-
gardless of the employment status of these employables, they may also 
be engaged in nonmarket work or even black market work. Presumably, 
which of the above conditions employables are in will be affected by 
their innate characteristics, their education, and their health, as well as 
by their preference for leisure.
Unemployables. Some people may be deemed to be unemployable 
and therefore not able to hold a job. Unemployability may stem from 
disability or poor health or from a very low skill level. In fact, defi n-
ing the status of unemployability is fraught with diffi culty. The distinc-
tion between being employable and being unemployable is bound to be 
somewhat arbitrary. There may be a continuum of one or more of the 
above personal characteristics (e.g., health status, skills) along which 
there is some point at which persons are deemed to be unemployable. 
Not only is this cutoff arbitrary, but it will be not be perfectly observ-
able to the government or to potential employers. Indeed, government 
agencies and private fi rms may have different ideas as to what this cut-
off should be. Moreover, strictly speaking, almost all persons—includ-
ing those who are mentally or physically disabled—could be employed 
doing some kind of work, even if fairly menial. However, their produc-
tivity may be such that the private sector would not hire them without 
the aid of a carrot or a stick.
Voluntarily out of the labor market. Finally, there are groups of 
people who choose not to enter the labor market. One such group is the 
retired, who have worked and now draw pension and capital incomes, 
and who may also draw support from family or charitable organiza-
tions. Even for these persons, withdrawal from the labor force may only 
be partial. Another group consists of persons who opt out of the labor 
market to be homemakers or to raise children. Finally, there are the 
young, who are in school or college. 
The informational problems regarding the individual’s attachment 
to the labor market, his or her income, and other personal characteristics 
in designing low-income support programs can in part be addressed 
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by different screening, auditing, and tagging mechanisms. As well, self-
selection mechanisms can sometimes be devised that make it unattract-
ive for some undeserving persons to apply. The lack of information 
regarding individual preferences and the type of uncertainty facing 
households is much more diffi cult to address. 
Characteristics of Program Administrators
Another type of informational problem facing the government 
stems from the fact that someone has to administer the program, and 
the government might not have complete information about who is do-
ing so. There may be agency problems. For example, if the effort to 
obtain information is costly for the social workers and unobservable 
by the government, then welfare applicants could be incorrectly classi-
fi ed (tagged) unless social workers are highly diligent. The government 
might then have to ensure that social workers put forth an appropriate 
level of effort by paying them according to results (Boadway, Marceau, 
and Sato 1999). It might also be the case that program workers have 
different objectives from the program designers. Since program work-
ers often make decisions about the eligibility of recipients, those who 
end up being served by the program may differ from the group the pro-
gram designers intended to target. These problems are very diffi cult to 
overcome. In the end, they may affect the extent to which discretion for 
program delivery is left in the hands of program administrators and how 
fi nely program benefi ts are targeted.
ASPECTS OF PROGRAM DESIGN
There are a variety of problems in designing support programs to 
address real income volatility. We summarize them in this section. 
Who Deserves Support?
The target population, a subset of which will be deemed to deserve 
support, includes those whose real incomes have fallen and who are not 
otherwise taken care of by unemployment insurance, workers’ com-
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pensation, disability insurance, or ordinary pensions. Nor are they able 
to self-insure through savings against uncertain circumstances—unlike, 
say, the self-employed in seasonal industries for whom reductions in 
income are expected, or maybe even those in risky industries whose 
earnings effectively compensate for the risk. For people in this situa-
tion, a diffi cult issue arises concerning the next-best remedy: it may be 
the case that persons who ought to be covered by contributory social 
insurance programs are not covered because of the defi ciency of ex-
isting programs. The ideal remedy would be to revise those programs 
rather than use low-income support programs as a device for insuring 
against adverse outcomes. However, if such remedies are not forth-
coming, presumably low-income support programs are the second-best 
instruments.
Even if the government could observe the actions and the charac-
teristics of all households whose real incomes have fallen, the policy 
problem would not be straightforward. An issue arises as to whether 
policy ought to distinguish between deserving and undeserving per-
sons, along the lines of the principles of compensation versus respon-
sibility. The principle of compensation states that in achieving some 
social objective, individuals should be compensated for inequalities 
in personal characteristics, but only for those characteristics for which 
they are not responsible. Thus, deserving persons might be those whose 
fate is a consequence of exogenous factors over which they have no 
infl uence. Nondeserving persons might be those whose actions have 
caused them to be in a needy state. The distinction between deserving 
and nondeserving persons is not clear, even in the absence of imper-
fect information. Behavioral economics emphasizes that individuals 
might have self-control problems that lead to overspending, addic-
tions, etc., and that they may regret the ex post outcomes that their 
earlier choices have caused. Should these persons be regarded as be-
ing responsible for their adverse states, or should self-control problems 
be regarded as part of one’s exogenously given preferences? (Public 
health care systems typically do not distinguish between those whose 
personal behavior has led to bad health outcomes and those who lead 
exemplary lives.) What about persons who acquire spending obliga-
tions because they have changed their household characteristics, such 
as by having a baby or separating from a partner? Perhaps a more clear-
cut case concerns persons whose incomes fall because of their own pre-
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meditated choices: they quit their jobs or reduced their hours of work. 
Should they be held responsible for their actions or should they be en-
titled to support? The matter is complicated not just by the ethical di-
lemma but also because there may be consequences to other persons. 
For example, other persons may depend on the income of the person in 
question, in which case the others suffer if support is not forthcoming. 
Or those suffering reductions in real income may turn to crime, which is 
a realistic alternative in many cases and involves various social costs. 
The heterogeneity of potential recipients reinforces the complex-
ity of the problems confronted in designing support programs for real 
income volatility. Not only may persons differ in many dimensions, but 
also such differences can lie along a continuum, blurring the distinction 
between the needy and the nonneedy. 
How to Elicit Information from Potential Recipients?
To complicate matters further, the government is likely to be imper-
fectly informed about the circumstances faced by given persons. The 
implication is that policies will typically need to have multiple com-
ponents and will include different means of targeting to ensure that re-
sources go to those most in need. Targeting can include instruments 
of self-selection that ensure unintended recipients do not receive as-
sistance (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988). Targeting may also include 
proactive measures to elicit information, such as tagging or monitoring 
(Boadway and Cuff 1999; Parsons 1996). 
Broadly speaking, eligibility for assistance may be based on self-
selection or it may be determined by screening applicants for eligibil-
ity. In the case of self-selection mechanisms, recipients freely choose 
whether to take up the benefi ts of the program with limited constraints, 
such as income or asset restrictions. Targeting is effectively achieved by 
designing the terms of the program in such a way that it is attractive only 
for intended recipients. Thus, public housing, public day care, or food 
stamps may be valued relatively more by needy families than by the 
nonneedy. Self-selection mechanisms are likely to be relatively crude 
means of targeting, so to avoid Type I errors such mechanisms may 
have to be fairly generous and universal. Their advantage is that they 
require minimal discretionary monitoring by administrative agencies.
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Screening mechanisms to determine eligibility can involve either 
ex post or ex ante monitoring. Ex post screening involves self-reporting 
of eligibility criteria by recipients and subsequent random auditing. An 
example of this would be transfers or refundable tax credits delivered 
through the tax system, the magnitude of which depends on income tax 
information provided by recipients. Governments would then conduct 
audits on the individuals by means such as taking stock of their assets, 
looking at bank records, making visits to the home, etc., to determine 
whether they had made accurate reports. Another example might be un-
employment insurance benefi ts if they apply as soon as an individual 
becomes unemployed. 
Ex ante screening, or tagging, involves determining eligibility on 
the basis of information made available at the time of application. Wel-
fare and disability programs are typically of this sort. To determine 
the employability of individuals, the government must verify whether 
an individual is medically able to work. Medical conditions can often 
be determined through assessment by medical professionals, although 
such assessments may vary from professional to professional. Changes 
in the employability of an individual for medical reasons will also re-
quire some continued monitoring of the individual’s condition, such 
as in the case of an injury or a curable disease, when the inability to 
work may only be temporary. Other individuals might fi nd it diffi cult 
to obtain work because of very low skill levels. They may not be able 
to read or may lack basic communication skills that most employers 
require to make them employable. The government can use observable 
characteristics that are correlated with the ability to work—such as lit-
eracy, education, and employment history—to tag an individual as em-
ployable. Finally, individuals might not be able to work because they 
are caring for dependents, such as an elderly parent or a young child. 
Again, the government can use available, observable information to 
verify the individual’s personal circumstances. Even if individuals are 
deemed employable, the government must try to determine whether the 
individual is voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed. To do this, the 
government will need to know not only the individual’s employment 
opportunities but also why the individual became unemployed (e.g., 
was laid off, quit, was fi red, etc.) and whether he or she is looking for 
work. Unemployed individuals could also differ in their assets, expen-
diture needs, skills, or health status, characteristics that may or may not 
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be observable but would also affect their need for assistance. Again, the 
government could gather information on observable characteristics to 
try to determine the actual need of the individual, or it could design the 
assistance program to try to screen out the nonneedy from the needy.
Both ex post and ex ante screening may involve continual subse-
quent ex post monitoring to ensure that recipients abide by the terms 
of the support. Individuals would have to be reassessed on a regular 
basis if the circumstances preventing them from working were subject 
to change—for example, if dependent children are cared for by another 
individual or enter public school. Likewise, some form of monitoring 
for job search activities and quits will be required, and to be effective 
the monitoring should apply to the various phases of job search, from 
application to job acceptance (Boadway and Cuff 1999). This form of 
monitoring might be diffi cult to do since an individual could impede his 
or her job search in many ways that would be virtually impossible to de-
tect. With imperfect monitoring, the ability to design transfers that treat 
the involuntarily unemployed more generously than the voluntarily un-
employed will be impeded (Boadway, Cuff, and Marceau 2003).
There are advantages and disadvantages to each type of screening. 
Ex ante screening is more fl exible and can readily respond to changes 
in circumstances, but it will be more costly than ex post screening, since 
every applicant must be screened. Both types of screening are bound to 
lead to errors of classifi cation and will result in both Type I and Type 
II errors. Type II errors increase the cost of the program by using up 
resources on those who should not be eligible for full support. Type I 
errors, on the other hand, compromise the integrity of support programs 
because deserving individuals are not receiving the support to which 
they are entitled. The incidence of Type I and Type II errors may be af-
fected by the type of screening. In the case of ex post screening, some 
Type II errors are detected ex post, by which time overpayments may be 
diffi cult to correct. With ex ante screening, the incidence of Type I er-
rors may be affected by individuals’ behavior. Deserving persons might 
simply not apply, whether because they are not fully informed about 
their eligibility, because it is costly to apply, or because they feel stig-
matized by the process. As well, given the uncertainty of the eligibil-
ity cutoff, potential applicants might not apply because of uncertainty 
about whether they will be deemed eligible. 
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Universal or Targeted Support Programs?
Program design must take into account the fact that the govern-
ment is not fully informed about the circumstances of households or 
the reasons for them. The program will be prone to having Type I and 
Type II errors, and, depending on the weight it puts on those errors, the 
generosity and design of the program will be affected. Type I errors are 
primarily a concern because they imply that some deserving persons are 
not obtaining support. The more averse to inequality the government 
is, the more it will try to avoid Type I errors. Type II errors represent 
leakages of funds to undeserving persons and are more of a concern for 
program costs. The government may have a limited budget to devote to 
support programs. The greater the Type II errors are, the less will be the 
level of assistance than can be afforded for the target population. The 
extent of Type I and Type II errors will depend both on the design of the 
program and on the extent of monitoring. Universal programs requiring 
less information regarding potential recipients will limit Type I errors to 
those who choose not to take up the program but will have large Type 
II errors, which are costly. An extreme form of universal program is the 
proposed basic income grant (Murray 2006; Wright 2006), in which all 
individuals, regardless of circumstance, receive a set amount of money. 
The rationale is to provide everyone with a basic income without stig-
matization so that they can participate more fully in society. It is not 
designed to address problems of volatility, so presumably it would need 
to be supplemented by targeted support programs. 
Type II errors can be reduced by targeting. Programs can be tar-
geted along several different dimensions: they may be means-tested, 
asset-tested, targeted to a specifi c demographic group, to a specifi c pop-
ulation such as pregnant women, or to a population in a specifi c region. 
The downside of a more targeted program is that Type I errors may 
be increased because of imperfect targeting. A targeted program might, 
however, have greater value when uncertainty of needs is an issue. It 
will be possible—indeed, necessary—for the government to improve 
its information by monitoring. But since monitoring is costly, both the 
form and the magnitude of monitoring will have to be traded off against 
the improvement of accuracy. 
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How Much Support to Provide?
A key issue is the extent to which reductions in real income should 
be replaced by government support. Even among the deserving target 
population, persons will face a variety of circumstances. They will 
have different real incomes, different numbers of dependents, and dif-
ferent expenditure needs. The question of how much support to award 
to each type of person will involve making comparisons of persons in 
heterogeneous circumstances. Even among persons who differ only in 
income, the extent to which those differences should be compensated 
involves a judgment about equity based on the decision maker’s aver-
sion to inequality. In a world of perfect information, one might argue 
that full social insurance would be optimal. Applying this in practice is 
not straightforward, particularly in the case of reductions in employ-
ment income. For one thing, the amount of ideal income replacement 
of a full insurance scheme will not generally be 100 percent; it will 
only be so if household preferences take a particular form (e.g., addi-
tively separable in consumption and leisure). Perhaps more important, 
full income insurance will almost never be incentive-compatible in a 
world of imperfect information. That is because, unless consumption 
and leisure are perfect substitutes, persons will typically be better off 
receiving support than working, since in the latter case they forgo lei-
sure and the utility that it yields. The extent of income insurance will be 
limited because of the incentive that it gives for potential recipients to 
become eligible for support and to stay on support as long as possible: 
the generosity of the program cannot lead to an expected outcome from 
obtaining support that exceeds the expected outcome from being in the 
workforce. Monitoring then becomes important as a device for relaxing 
that incentive constraint. Ex ante monitoring can detect some persons 
whose income falls because they voluntarily reduce their income by 
quitting work or reducing their hours; it can also detect those who mis-
report their incomes. Ex post monitoring can detect some persons who 
prolong their stay on support programs by not searching for employ-
ment or accepting job offers. From this point of view, more intensive 
monitoring essentially allows insurance to be more complete by relax-
ing the incentive constraint (Boadway and Cuff 1999).
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How Feasible Are Monetary Sanctions?
A further problem facing the government concerns the sanctions 
that can be imposed on persons who are found to have misrepresented 
their circumstances (e.g., their income or their living arrangements) or 
who fail to abide by the requirements of receiving support (e.g., by 
quitting or by not engaging in job searches). By imposing a very large 
penalty, full conformity with program objectives should result, even if 
monitoring is very limited (Becker 1968). However, in the context of 
low-income support programs, there will be a limit to which sanctions 
can be relied on to reduce exploitation by the nondeserving. Those who 
have been detected exploiting the system will typically have limited 
resources, so there will be a problem of limited liability (Polinsky and 
Shavell 1991). Even if they are able to pay, a monetary sanction would 
be onerous. (This has been a problem with refundable tax credit pro-
grams targeted at low-income persons, where recovering overpayments 
has been diffi cult.) An alternative to monetary sanctions is to restrict fu-
ture eligibility, but that might also be problematic given that the persons 
involved already have low incomes. On top of this, there may be errors 
associated with monitoring. The implication is that there is a limit to the 
ability to rely on sanctions, which puts more pressure on monitoring to 
preclude Type II errors.
What Form Should Government Support Take?
The form that support should take is judgmental even with perfect 
information. The classic view, based on a welfaristic objective function, 
would be that cash transfers are desirable since they lead to the highest 
level of welfare of the recipients. However, the welfaristic approach is 
not necessarily the one that an optimizing government would choose. If 
the government’s redistribution goals are motivated by the perceived al-
truism of taxpayers, and if that altruism is based on paternalistic prefer-
ences, effi cient redistribution may involve in-kind transfers, depending 
on the form that paternalism takes. If taxpayers value the consumption 
of all goods and services of low-income recipients but not their leisure, 
cash transfers are desirable. However, if their altruistic preferences in-
clude only a narrower set of goods, then transfers or subsidies of those 
goods may be more effi cient. Behavioral considerations might also jus-
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tify support that is contingent on the consumption of particular goods, 
such as those that favor food and shelter over alcohol and tobacco. 
Finally, cash transfers might be insuffi cient if markets are missing or 
imperfect. If the market for medical insurance is incomplete, it may be 
more effi cient for support based on medical needs to take the form of 
direct provision of medical care.
There are serious problems with operationalizing paternalism, what-
ever the argument for it. The altruistic preferences of taxpayers are like-
ly to be heterogenous, implying that even if the preferences were known 
it would not be possible to obtain a consensus on the correct form of 
the transfer. Even if there were a consensus on the form of paternalistic 
preferences, as there might be in the case of behavioral-based paternal-
ism, translating that consensus into a specifi c policy might be diffi cult. 
For example, if paternalism favored basic commodities, such as food, 
shelter, clothing, and other necessities, resale possibilities might make 
it diffi cult to constrain recipients from using the in-kind transfer in ways 
not intended. It may, however, be possible to use electronic payment 
mechanisms, such as those used for food stamps, to restrict retrading.
The choice of transfer instrument may also be affected by stigmati-
zation, although this might be expected to work in favor of cash trans-
fers (at least in the absence of administrative arguments). The use of in-
kind transfers like food stamps typically requires that recipients identify 
themselves. To the extent that this induces feelings of stigmatization in 
recipients, it might be regarded as a disadvantage. Cash transfers, on the 
other hand, have no such stigma attached to their use. There may well be 
stigmatization associated with both cash and in-kind transfers through 
the process of application, recertifi cation, and monitoring; however, the 
possibility of stigma might actually be an advantage in the sense that it 
may induce self-selection into the program by those who are needy.
It is also conceivable that incentive effects will differ between cash 
and in-kind transfers. Recipients can use cash transfers as they see fi t, 
whereas in-kind transfers will generally not be a perfect substitute for 
earned income. Recipients may therefore have an incentive to supple-
ment in-kind transfers with earnings that can be spent on other goods. 
As a result, work effort may be discouraged less under in-kind transfers 
than under cash transfers, and that may constitute an important argu-
ment enhancing the paternalistic case for in-kind transfers. Of course, 
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the force of this argument depends on the nature of income conditions 
attached to the receipt of support. 
Related to this is the role of in-kind transfers in deterring time-con-
sistency or Samaritan’s Dilemma consequences. Potential recipients of 
income support have an incentive to engage in actions that increase the 
chances that they will receive support in the future. The form of aid will 
affect a potential recipient’s incentive to make these short-sighted deci-
sions. If aid comes as cash, recipients can easily replace any lost income 
stemming from their poor decisions with the cash transfers. If, on the 
other hand, aid comes in the form of in-kind transfers of necessities, 
they may fi nd these actions less attractive than taking more farsighted 
actions that leave them with higher incomes in the future, as the in-kind 
transfers cannot perfectly replace their lost income from their earlier 
decisions. Moreover, to preclude potential recipients from underprovid-
ing for their long-term needs, low-income persons could be provided 
training or other forms of forced investment rather than income support 
that they may squander. 
The choice of policy instrument can also be infl uenced by the infor-
mation problems faced by the government. The use of in-kind transfers 
rather than cash may be justifi ed on informational grounds. By offer-
ing lower-quality goods rather than cash, the government might ensure 
that only those truly in need will receive assistance. Similar arguments 
might also be made in favor of using in-kind transfers over subsidies for 
the purchase of particular goods and services. There may be other eco-
nomic arguments, however, in favor of implicit subsidies like housing or 
education vouchers. Other policy instruments might also act as screen-
ing tools to help separate the deserving from the nondeserving, such as 
workfare, employment assistance services, or training programs. 
What Are the Incentive Effects of Support Programs?
Assistance programs may affect individuals’ incentives to work, to 
save, to participate in the underground economy, to undertake training 
or education, to cohabitate, to have children, and to move to a differ-
ent locale. Often programs are designed with such incentive effects in 
mind, although unintended effects might arise. As well, the fact that the 
government is imperfectly informed implies that it cannot observe fully 
the incentive effects that the program induces. This includes the incen-
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tives that persons have to make themselves eligible for the program 
by infl uencing their own real incomes, as well as the incentives that 
they have to change their situation once their real incomes have fallen. 
Again, monitoring by the government will mitigate this problem. But 
the design of the program will also be compromised to avoid adverse 
incentive effects.
The level and form of support might also be affected by the possi-
bility that private support (e.g., charity) might be crowded out. It is effi -
cient to exploit private support as much as possible since the effi ciency 
cost of this support is less than the cost of public funds. That is, the cost 
per dollar of public funds can be signifi cantly higher than one dollar 
because of the incremental deadweight loss associated with raising ad-
ditional revenue through the tax system (Browning 1976). Income and 
other support transferred voluntarily do not incur a deadweight loss. 
This is one reason why it is effi cient to subsidize voluntary donations 
made by households to charitable causes (Diamond 2006).
How Often Should Recipients Be Recertifi ed?
As highlighted by Ribar and Edeloch in this volume, qualifi ed 
households may fail to undertake the necessary paperwork to be recerti-
fi ed for program benefi ts. It is not entirely clear why even those who are 
eligible to take public benefi ts are not doing so. Perhaps it is diffi cult to 
understand what is needed to be recertifi ed for the program, or perhaps 
recipients lack important information about recertifi cation deadlines. 
The time involved to be reassessed on a continual basis might be sub-
stantial. Furthermore, the assistance program might not be an entitle-
ment program, so even if the programs are designed well, only a fraction 
of eligible persons may receive benefi ts. As such, some individuals may 
choose not to bother applying. There could also be long waiting periods 
before benefi ts are actually received. A consequence of a slow certifi ca-
tion period is that it is possible to imagine cases in which a household 
switches from qualifying to not qualifying as its real income fl uctuates, 
and so is penalized by the slowness of the response of the programs to 
changing circumstances. There might also be an asymmetric response 
of the program: it may take more time to qualify than to be disqualifi ed. 
Or, certifi cation may take place at a fi xed point in time, such as in the 
National School Lunch Program, where applications are administered 
up08djivafch8.indd   249 10/8/2008   10:40:27 AM
250   Boadway, Cuff, and Marceau
at the beginning of the school year. It is possible the program may fail to 
offer help to those who fi nd themselves in need during the school year. 
Assistance in the form of refundable and nonrefundable tax credits is 
also very slow to respond to changes in household circumstances: such 
credits are calculated only once a year based on the previous total an-
nual income. Households might also have to reapply every so often to 
the program to continue to receive benefi ts. 
How Responsive Is the Support Program? 
Finally, how effective an assistance program will be in helping 
those facing real income volatility will in part be determined by how 
readily the program can respond to changes in an individual’s circum-
stances. Those in the relevant target population will typically have 
limited resources to fall back on, so the need for timely provision of 
support is paramount. The responsiveness of support programs will de-
pend on how quickly the program administrators can obtain and verify 
information regarding changes in an individual’s circumstances. Along 
some dimensions the government may be able to respond more quickly 
than others. For example, verifying the termination of an individual’s 
employment may be easier than verifying changes in family support. 
From the point of view of responsiveness to changes in need, it may 
be useful to consider mechanisms that do not require ex ante monitor-
ing to determine eligibility. Temporary support might be granted on the 
basis of limited ex ante screening, with more permanent support being 
awarded only with further monitoring of an individual’s circumstances. 
This might be prudent, given that some persons have very limited abil-
ity to self-insure against sudden misfortune and they also have limited 
access to outside social support networks. 
An issue of program design is how to harmonize support for income 
variability with longer-term support for those in chronic need. Some 
arguments support the notion that the short-term response to income 
variability should differ from long-term support. One could argue that 
erring on the generous side makes sense in the context of variability of 
income for low-income persons. These persons are likely to fi nd it dif-
fi cult to self-insure, which means they cannot easily adjust to a decline 
in real income. They may have commitments that are diffi cult to undo 
in the short run, such as housing rental contracts. Type II errors may 
up08djivafch8.indd   250 10/8/2008   10:40:27 AM
Design of Assistance Programs to Address Real Income Volatility   251
be more tolerable and Type I errors less tolerable in the short run than 
in the long run, given that it takes time to sort out persons according 
to their need. Incentive effects may be limited in the short run since it 
takes time to adjust one’s earnings from employment or self-employ-
ment. These arguments suggest that support should be more generous 
and eligibility less restrictive for temporary than for long-run support. 
Administrative considerations complement these policy considerations. 
In the case of policies to respond to reductions in real income, the key 
consideration is timeliness—that is, determining eligibility as quickly 
as possible. That precludes delivering support through the income tax 
system, such as by refundable tax credits, since this is not responsive to 
sudden changes in circumstances. Other mechanisms with ex post mon-
itoring might be feasible, such as allowing individuals to report their 
own eligibility, subject to ex post auditing for verifi cation accompanied 
by appropriate penalties. The fear is that this would lead to excessive 
Type II errors, which could not be corrected by ex post monitoring be-
cause sanctions might be diffi cult to enforce. 
It seems more reasonable to determine eligibility using an ex ante 
monitoring approach where persons apply and are subject to initial 
screening. The mechanisms already exist to do this. Given the special 
urgency that might be attached to the need for assistance in this case, as 
well as the time it takes to screen fully, one might argue for reasonably 
lenient screening initially, followed by more detailed screening subse-
quently for continuing eligibility. Lenient screening will minimize Type 
I errors initially, although it may well invite Type II errors. Perhaps the 
possibility of Type II errors can be reduced by using the past history of 
applicants as a source of information. For example, repeat users could 
be discouraged. Leniency for fi rst-time applicants might also increase 
the take-up rate for persons who might be deterred from applying for 
fear of being turned down.
The timeliness issue might also have implications for the form of 
the transfer. Support that can be processed rapidly would be preferred. 
Cash certainly fi ts this criterion. Food transfers might as well, given 
that mechanisms are already in place for administering them, although 
presumably there is some time delay in setting up recipients with food-
stamp electronic cards initially. Other types of in-kind transfers, such 
as rent subsidies, might be more costly to implement in a short time 
frame.
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CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this chapter has been to explore the issues involved 
in designing and implementing income support programs to deal with 
real income volatility. Many of the same issues arise with these types of 
programs as arise with support programs designed to respond to needs 
of a more persistent nature. These issues include the identifi cation of 
those deserving of support, the quantifi cation of needs, the choice of 
cash versus subsidies versus in-kind transfers, the availability of other 
forms of support, the incentive effects created by programs that are 
either too generous or not generous enough, the type of targeting to 
employ, and the role of monitoring or auditing to ensure compliance. 
Resolving these issues is diffi cult because of the unavoidability of mak-
ing value judgments and because of that fact that the government faces 
informational constraints. It is not surprising that low-income support 
programs rely on a multitude of instruments and approaches involving 
combinations of cash transfers, in-kind transfers (such as food), subsi-
dies, work and training programs, and social services of various types. 
Support programs to deal with the consequences of volatility face 
additional problems. Most important is the need for timeliness in identi-
fying and assisting those whose real incomes have fallen unexpectedly. 
Low-income persons will typically have diffi culty insuring against ad-
verse shocks, and to the extent that they can insure it will be very costly 
and sometimes carry long-term consequences. Moreover, incentive ef-
fects may well be less severe in the short run than in the long. This sug-
gests that the response to short-term volatility should be more generous 
than for more persistent need, and that the issue of Type II errors should 
be given less weight. At the same time, the need to distinguish between 
short-term need and long-term need implies reasonably short recertifi -
cation periods as well as other measures, such as monitoring and audit-
ing, that facilitate compliance. 
Despite the long list of diffi culties associated with designing sup-
port programs to deal with real income volatility, it is important to stress 
that the downside of not offering adequate support for low income vola-
tility should not be underestimated. The options for those needing as-
sistance are often more costly to society in the long run than providing 
the assistance when needed.
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Notes
We are grateful for comments by the editors, Dean Jolliffe and Jim Ziliak; the discus-
sant, Luigi Pistaferri; and participants in the conference “Income Volatility and Im-
plications for Food Assistance Programs II,” November 16–17, 2006, sponsored by 
the University of Michigan’s National Poverty Center and by the USDA’s Economic 
Research Service. 
 1. For the reader interested in details about actual low-income support programs, 
Currie (2006) provides an excellent overview of current U.S. assistance 
programs.
 2. Information problems can also affect access to housing for low-income house-
holds. Adverse selection can arise when the probability of defaulting on one’s rent 
is not observable. Landlords may fi nd it profi table to lower the rent they charge 
to a level below the market-clearing rent, thereby reducing the average probabil-
ity of default but generating excess housing demand and homelessness (Cuff and 
Marceau 2007). 
 3. Whether or not these asset limits actually constrain low-income individuals is 
unclear. Recent empirical papers have examined the effect of such limits on the 
assets of households with high probabilities of welfare receipt. Increases in asset 
limits appear to have had no impact on the liquid assets held by these house-
holds but some positive effect on vehicle assets (Hurst and Ziliak 2006; Sullivan 
2006). 
 4. This social welfare function with constant relative aversion to inequality can be 
derived from underlying axioms about social preferences. Such a form is possible 
under the assumption that individual utility functions are comparable and measur-
able up to a ratio scale. That is, proportional changes in utility are comparable 
across individuals. See Boadway and Bruce (1984), Chapter 5. Another single-
parameter social welfare function is one where the absolute aversion to inequality 
is constant. The social choice foundations for this are discussed in Bossert and 
Weymark (2004).
 5. To use an example cited by Sen (1973), suppose two persons of equal productivity 
differ in the utility they obtain from a given amount of income. If society’s aver-
sion to inequality is high, one would want to redistribute from those who are more 
effi cient utility-generators to those who are less, while if aversion to inequality is 
low, one might want to redistribute from those who are less effi cient at generat-
ing utility to the more effi cient ones. The analogue would be with education or 
health expenditures (Arrow 1971). Should educational resources be concentrated 
on those who are most able to use them? Or should those who have more diffi culty 
learning be favored? Similarly, should health expenditures be allocated to persons 
with affl ictions that are easier to treat, or to those with affl ictions more diffi cult to 
treat?
 6. The idea that social capital can help poor people insure their consumption against 
adverse shocks is controversial. In a recent paper, Gertler, Levine, and Moretti 
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(2006) fi nd, using Indonesian data, that families hit by a health shock suffer a 
decline in consumption that is unrelated to the presence of a social network or 
a wealthy extended family. Thus, social capital seems to be of no help for those 
families. This is in contrast to the previous literature on the subject, surveyed in 
Gertler, Levine, and Moretti (2006), which fi nds that social capital can play the 
role of an insurance policy against adverse consumption shock.
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